The Changing Face of Jihad – Culture Trumps Ideology

Analyzing radical Islam, author Thomas Hegghamer writing in TLS concluded his article by stating that “six years after 9/11, the study of Jihadism is still in its infancy.” In his review of Omar Nassiri’s book detailing the inside operation of Al- Qaeda, Hegghamer provided an all encompassing commentary touching on the research of many western political authors. In particular, Hegghamer’s reference to Mark Sageman’s finding that “radicalization is above all a social, not an ideological profile” provides a useful social context within which to continue our special series on Jihad [see PI 901 to 906] with Hossam Tammams article: “Is the Egyptian Influence Giving Way in the Al-Qaeda Movement?”

 Tammam examines how the composition of the Jihad movement’s membership has changed since its inception on February 22nd 1998. The writer notes that a certain competition seems to be present recently between Bin Laden and his deputy Al- Zawahiri. According to Tammam, the latest broadcasts by both over the past few days reveal a lack of coordination between them as evidenced by the overlap in their coverage of the issues. Tammam notes that the Saudi factions in the movement also seem to exhibit a certain wariness towards the numerous speeches by Bin Laden’s deputy Al-Zawahari, seeing them as an attempt to take over the leadership.

The Egyptian Nucleus

Tammam refers to the latest book appearing on internet sites in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the birth of Al-Qaeda: “Martyrs during Time of Exile”. The book was published by the “Al-Fajr Center”, considered an arm of Al-Qaeda. It is devoted in large part to eleven Egyptian members who occupied important positions in the movement. The unknown author, writing under the pseudonym ‘Abu ‘Ubaydah al-Maqdisi, dedicated the book to the Egyptian Sayyed Qutb. Both of these facts, according to Tammam, seem to be an attempt to remind people of the importance of the Egyptian influence on the movement.

Since the birth of Al-Qaeda, the question regarding the national origin of its members has often been raised. The early days, according to Tammam, favored the Egyptian factions with their expertise in many forms of military training. Following the murder of President Sadat several Egyptian Jihadi factions were born. That Egyptian nucleus is considered the first generation of Jihadi centered around Bin Laden, with Al-Zawahiri at the head. Al- Zawahiri was the strategic brain and the most influential person in the movement. At that time and aside from Bin laden, the Saudi presence on the Jihadi scene was still in its infancy

The Saudi Salafi Presence

Tammam presents a different picture of the past few years. The Egyptian supply of Jihadi members dried up, due mostly to the continuous assault on their members by the regime and to reconsideration by their members of Al- Qaeda’s militant position. That change coincided with the opening of the Saudi front, triggered by the discovery of a substantial reserve of Salafi-indoctrinated individuals that, according to Tammam “rivaled the reserve of Saudi oil.”

While Bin Laden is almost the only known figure coming from the Gulf, there is no doubt that the region contributed a substantial number of Salafi-indoctrinated members to fight in Afghanistan and later in Iraq. That new supply of members came at the expense of the Egyptians whose presence diminished by comparison.

The New Comers

A strong branch of the Salafi ideology is also supplying new members from North Africa (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) and from the costal countries, Mauritania and Mali. According to Tammam, the clamp down on Islamists in Tunisia and Libya benefited the movement’s efforts to recruit youth to Al-Qaeda. That was coupled with the lack of a government presence in vast areas of Algeria, particularly in the south. This allowed Jihadi members relatively free movement, similarly to Mauritania and Mali. The Libyans currently make up the third largest nationality in the movement. The Moroccans are the group most drawn to Iraq, and the Mauritanians have been the most active jihadis over the past year.

The Egyptian influence is no longer significant, except in the very visible presence of Al-Zawahiri who still wields considerable strategic influence, but the charisma and funding is Bin Laden’s.

The mere presence of articles, such as Tammam’s, which address the changing national make-up of the Jihadi movement’s membership reinforces Sageman’s findings that the cultural relationship between members, rather than ideology, remains the most influential factor in recruitment. If Tammam is correct that the rivalry between the Egyptians and the Saudi is a real factor, this is further support for his point that cultural considerations are trumping ideology.

When ideology fails to produce territorial deliverables and passion for the cause diminishes, the floundering movement becomes heavily dependent upon members attracting others through their shared culture and nationality. To sustain and grow a movement built on such camaraderie requires constantly reaching out to different nationalities and an ever younger pool of recruits who may be attracted by mythical successes of the past.

 PI Online

http://politicalislam.org/embed_doc.php?ArticleID=204